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NORTH CAROLINA ADOPTS THE INEVITABLE
DISCOVERY EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE: - State v. Garner
INTRODUCTION
The exclusionary rule generally bars the admission of evidence
obtained by government officials through unconstitutional means.1
The rule has long been criticized as too costly to justify its applica-
tion.2 One of the main concerns regarding the exclusionary rule is
that guilty criminals may go unpunished because evidence of their
guilt was kept from the trier of fact.' That is, criminals are af-
forded a windfall at the expense of law enforcement officials and
society." To ameliorate its sometimes harsh results, a number of
exceptions to the exclusionary rule have arisen over the years.5 In a
recent case,6 the North Carolina Supreme Court followed the' lead
of a majority of the federal and state courts and adopted one of the
more controversial of the growing list of the rule's exceptions, the
inevitable discovery doctrine.7 In sustaining a first-degree murder
1. See generally WAYNm R. LAFAvE, SEARcH AND SEIZuRE: A TREATIsE, ON THE
FomrTH AMENDMENT § 1.1 (1987) (discussion of origins and purposes of exclusion-
ary rule); see also infra notes 12-41 and accompanying text.
2. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 1.2 (discussion of criticisms of ex-
clusionary rule and proposed limitations on its application).
3. See, e.g., John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L.
REV. 1027 (1974). Professor Kaplan wrote "[o]ne must acknowledge that the ex-
clusionary rule often allows a criminal to escape punishment." Id. at 1035.
4. This fear of an undue burden being placed upon society and the prosecu-
tion was enunciated in an often quoted passage from a Cardozo opinion: "The
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered." People v. Defore, 150
N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926) (suppression of illegally
obtained evidence denied). But see Silas Wasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The
Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was it a Fair Trial?, 22 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 85, 87-88 n.21 (1984) (no empirical evidence that abolition of exclusionary
rule would result in increase in conviction rate); John W. Hall, Jr., In Defense of
the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule-A Reply to Attorney General
Smith, 6 U. ARK. LrrmE RoCK L.J. 227, 239 (1983) (exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence does not mean criminal goes free).
5. See infra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
6. State v. Garner, 331 N.C. 491, 417 S.E.2d 502 (1992).
7. Id. The inevitable discovery doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary
rule which is applied when the prosecution can demonstrate that illegally ob-
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conviction in State v. Garner, the North Carolina Supreme Court
held that illegally obtained evidence could be used in a defendant's
criminal trial because the prosecution demonstrated by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the officers would have inevitably pro-
cured the same evidence by lawful means.8 The majority opinion
relied primarily on Nix u. Williams,9 a case in which the United
States Supreme Court recognized the inevitable discovery doctrine.
The concurring opinion raised questions concerning the proper use
of the exception, the quantum of proof required by the state con-
stitution, and the justifications for North Carolina's exclusionary
rule. 10
This Note will analyze the reasoning of the majority and con-
curring opinions in Garner, as well as Garner's relationship to
prior North Carolina exclusionary rule cases. The author contends
that the majority opinion is inconsistent with those prior cases and
faults the majority for adopting an unacceptably lenient standard
of proof as to inevitability, and for failing to delineate the parame-
ters of the exception. The Note concludes that the concurrence
more accurately reflects the court's past respect for the importance
of the exclusionary rule in protecting individual privacy rights.11
tained evidence would have been eventually discovered by lawful means. See gen-
erally JOHN W. HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 7:13-7:17 (2d ed. 1991). See also
infra notes 40-65 and accompanying text.
8. 331 N.C. at 504, 417 S.E.2d at 509.
9. 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (Williams I). The inevitable discovery doctrine had
previously been adopted by all of the circuit courts. Id. at 440 n.2. Several circuits
did so after the Supreme Court revealed in a footnote in Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387 (1977) (Williams I), that such evidence might be admissible. The Court
stated:
While neither Williams' incriminating statements themselves nor any
testimony describing his having led the police to the victim's body can
constitutionally be admitted into evidence, evidence of where the body
was found and of its condition might well be admissible on the theory
that the body would have been discovered in any event, even had incrim-
inating statements not been elicited from Williams.
Id. at 406 n.12.
10. Garner, 331 N.C. at 510, 417 S.E.2d at 512 (Frye, J., concurring). Justice
Frye's disagreements with the majority opinion concerned the quantum of proof
required for inevitability and the basis for the exclusionary rule in North Caro-
lina. See infra notes 105-122. Chief Justice Exum joined Justice Frye's concurring
opinion.
11. See State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988); see also infra
notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
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A. Origin and Development of the Exclusionary Rule
The common law rule, reaffirmed as late as 1904 by the United
States Supreme Court in Adams v. New York,1 - provided that all
relevant evidence the government possessed was admissible regard-
less of how it had been obtained. In Boyd v. United States,4 the
Court recognized, however, that exclusion of evidence was neces-
sary in a self-incrimination case because of the close relationship
between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 5 The Court reasoned
that compulsory production of an individual's private papers con-
stituted, in essence, a forced confession, prohibited by the Fifth
Amendment. 6 The Supreme Court first grounded the exclusionary
rule in whole upon the Fourth Amendment in Weeks v. United
States.1 7 Both Boyd and Weeks involved the return of private pa-
pers that had been wrongfully seized. Thus, after Weeks, there ex-
isted a narrow rule of exclusion applying only to property that peo-
ple were entitled to own.' 8 In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States,9 the Court extended the exclusionary rule beyond the re-
turn of personal property and held that evidence unconstitution-
12. 192 U.S. 585 (1904); see generally Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v.
Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary
Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365 (1983).
13. Adams, 192 U.S. at 595. The Court stated:
When papers are offered in evidence the court can take no notice how
they were obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully, nor would they form
a collateral issue to determine that question.
Id.
14. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
15. Id. at 630-35.
16. Id. at 633-35.
17. 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (evidence obtained through an illegal search and
seizure not admissible at trial in a federal prosecution).
18. See Stewart, supra note 12, at 1375.
19. 251 U.S. 385 (1921). In Silverthorne, federal agents conducted an illegal
search of the offices of a lumber company. Id. After copying and photographing
papers that had been seized during the illegal search, the agents returned all of
the documents. Id. A federal grand jury then issued a subpoena duces tecum pur-
suant to which the lumber company was required to bring the original papers to
the trial. Id. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment provided more protec-
tion than simply the return of illegally seized property. Id. at 392. Justice Holmes
wrote:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a'
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used
before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.
3
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ally obtained could not be used by the prosecution for any pur-
pose. o Two cases decided after Silverthorne left no doubt that the
common law rule of admission of all probative evidence had been
rejected.2
In Wolf v. Colorado,22 the Supreme Court held the Fourth
Amendment applied to the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it did not require the exclusion
of evidence obtained by unlawful means in a state court prosecu-
tion for a state crime.23 The Court, in declining to extend the ex-
clusionary rule to the states, left each state free to experiment with
alternative methods of protecting the constitutional rights of its
citizens. 24
In Mapp v. Ohio,2 5 the Court recognized that the failure to
extend the exclusionary rule to the states in Wolf had resulted in
inconsistent methods of enforcement among the states, and cir-
cumvention of the rule by federal officers in states that had not
adopted the exclusionary rule as a remedy.2 The Court overruled
Wolf and held that evidence obtained by an illegal search and
seizure was inadmissible in a state criminal trial. Previously, the
exclusionary rule had only been mandated as a remedy in the fed-
eral courts for constitutional violations by federal officers.2 8 The
20. Id.
21. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). In an opinion an-
nounced the same day as Gouled, the Court held that whiskey seized unlawfully
from defendant's home should have been excluded from evidence. Amos v. United
States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921). See also The Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule,
REP. to ATr'Y GEN., at 9 (Feb. 26, 1986) ("[Amos] began a trend of focusing on the
manner in which the government obtained the evidence rather than on the nature
of the evidence.").
22. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
23. Id. at 33.
24. Id.
25. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
26. Id. at 658. Justice Clark wrote:
In nonexclusionary States, federal officers, being human, were by it in-
vited to and did, as our cases indicate, step across the street to the
State's attorney with their unconstitutionally seized evidence. Prosecu-
tion on the basis of that evidence was then had in a state court in utter
disregard of the enforceable Fourth Amendment. If the fruits of an un-
constitutional search had been inadmissible in both state and federal
courts, this inducement to evasion would have been sooner eliminated.
Id.
27. Id. at 653-55.
28. See, e.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1921);
[Vol. 15:305
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main concern of the Court in Mapp. was the protection of the fun-
damental right to privacy.29 Noting that the exclusionary rule is a
constitutionally required right of the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments,30 the Court further justified its decision to apply the exclu-
sionary rule to the states upon the imperative of judicial integrity,1
and the deterrence of police misconduct.12
Two years after Mapp the Supreme Court extended the exclu-
sionary rule to verbal statements that are the "fruits" of an unlaw-
ful search in Wong Sun v. United States.3 3 Following Wong Sun,
see also The Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, supra note 21, at 9-10.
29. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655-57. The Court stated:
[I]n extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitu-
tionally unreasonable searches-state or federal-it was logically and
constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doctrine-an essential part
of the right to privacy-be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient
of the right newly recognized by the Wolf case. In short, the admission of
the new constitutional right by Wolf could not consistently tolerate de-
nial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion
of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of
the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality
to withhold its piivilege and enjoyment.
Id. at 655-56.
30. Id. at 656-57. See Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsch, Up From
Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L.
REv. 251 (1974); HALL, supra note 7, § 4:4 (discussion of Mapp v. Ohio and its
early progeny). But see David H. Mautel, Note, The Inevitable Discovery Excep-
tion to the Exclusionary Rule: What is Standing in the Way of Supreme Court
Adoption?, 16 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1043, 1044 n.9 (1982) (exclusion is not constitu-
tionally mandated; Mapp Court held that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence
was only implied from Fourth Amendment). Justice Stewart wrote, years after the
Mapp decision, that he believed the exclusionary rule to be constitutionally re-
quired, "not as a 'right' explicitly incorporated in the fourth amendment's
prohibitions, but as a remedy necessary to ensure that those prohibitions are ob-
served in fact." Stewart, supra note 12, at 1389. Justice Black concurred in the
result in Mapp but stated that he found no express constitutional basis for the
exclusionary rule. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 662.
31. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657-59.
32. Id. at 656. The Court stated that the purpose of the exclusionary rule "is
to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effective
available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it." Id. (quoting Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
33. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine bars the
use of derivative evidence discovered by exploitation of a prior police illegality.
The phrase "fruit of the poisonous tree" was first used in Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). The doctrine is closely related to the attenuation
doctrine, as the focus in both involves the proximity of the unconstitutional police
1993]
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the Court began to narrow the application of the exclusionary rule.
As criticism of the exclusionary rule increased,34 the Supreme
Court created exceptions 5 and also limited the situations in which
it would be applied.3 6 In addition, the Court has all but abandoned
the judicial integrity argument and has increasingly grounded the
rule on a deterrence principle.3 7
activity to the evidence subsequently discovered. See HALL, supra note 7, §§ 7:1-
7:17 (discussion of exceptions allowing use of derivative evidence in chapter on
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine). See also LAFAvE, supra note 1, § 11.4 (dis-
cussion of fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine).
34. See Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 665 (1970) (exclusionary rule does not deter Fourth
Amendment violations); Harvey Wingo, Growing Disillusionment with the Exclu-
sionary Rule, 25 Sw. L.J. 573 (1971) (exclusionary rule criticized and alternatives
proposed).
35. The Court has specifically identified four situations in which exclusion of
tainted evidence is not required. See generally Kevin J. Kehoe, Jr. et al., Project,
Twentieth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court
and Courts of Appeals 1989-1990, 79 GEo. L.J. 591, 731-41 (1991) (discussion of
exceptions to exclusionary rule). The Court created the first exception to the ex-
clusionary rule in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
The "'independent source" exception allows the admission of illegally obtained
evidence if it was also discovered through independent legal means. A second ex-
ception, "attenuation," was recognized in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338
(1939). This exception allows the admission of evidence when the connection be-
tween the illegal conduct and the acquisition of the challenged evidence is so at-
tenuated that it dissipates the taint of the unlawful act. Thirdly, the Court recog-
nized a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897 (1984). The Court held that evidence need not be suppressed when
police obtain the evidence through objective good faith reliance on a facially valid
warrant subsequently found to be lacking in probable cause. Id. at 913. The good
faith exception was extended to admit evidence obtained by police who acted in
objectively reasonable reliance on an unconstitutional statute. Illinois v. Krull,
480 U.S. 340 (1987). Lastly one of the more controversial exceptions to the exclu-
sionary rule, the inevitable discovery doctrine, was adopted by the Court in Nix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). See infra notes 41-66 and accompanying text.
36. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (exclusionary rule has
no application in federal grand jury proceedings); I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468
U.S. 1032 (1984) (rule does not attach in deportation hearings); United States v.
Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (rule cannot be invoked to exclude evidence sought
to be admitted for impeachment purposes of witness testimony); Brown v. United
States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973) (rule inapplicable to exclude evidence incriminating a
party not actually subjected to the unconstitutional search); Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976) (federal habeas corpus relief on ground that illegally obtained
evidence was admitted at trial is unavailable to a state prisoner who has had full
and fair state trial).
37. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (primary, if not sole,
310 [Vol. 15:305
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The clearest articulation of the heightened scrutiny under
which the exclusionary rule is viewed came in United States v. Ca-
landra,3" in which the Court refused to apply the rule to grand jury
proceedings.3 9 The Court promulgated a cost-benefit analysis to
determine if exclusion would serve the rule's primary purpose of
deterrence in each particular case.40 With the deterrence principle
as the sole remaining underpinning of the exclusionary rule, the
Supreme Court had no difficulty adding the exception of inevitable
discovery.41 It is against this background, that the Court assessed
the constitutionality and parameters of the inevitable discovery
doctrine in Nix v. Williams:42 (1) the deterrence principle was con-
sidered the preeminent justification for the exclusionary rule and
(2) exclusion of illegally obtained evidence was no longer viewed as
a constitutional right of the accused, but rather as a sanction to be
applied under a cost-benefit analysis.4
purpose of exclusionary rule is deterrence of future unlawful police misconduct);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976) (exclusionary rule not a personal consti-
tutional right but judicially created remedy; primary justification is deterrence of
police conduct violative of Fourth Amendment rights). But see Hall, supra note 4,
at 239 (advocating reemergence of personal right rationale for exclusionary rule).
38. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). Justice Powell wrote, "the rule is a judicially created
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its de-
terrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."
Id. at 348. See HALL, supra note 7, § 4:8, at 157 ("After Calandra, the exclusion-
ary rule existed only for the purpose of deterring unconstitutional conduct. After
Leon, the rule exists only to deter willful or reckless unconstitutional conduct.").
39. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349-52.
40. Id. at 349-52. Under this approach, evidence is deemed inadmissible only
when the benefits of deterrence will outweigh the social costs incurred by exclu-
sion of probative evidence. Id. With the exclusionary rule viewed as a judicially
created remedy, its application is to be "restricted to those areas where its reme-
dial objectives are thought most efficaciously served." Id. at 348.
41. See Daniel S. Schneider, Comment, The Future of the Exclusionary Rule
and the Development of State Constitutional Law, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 377, 383-84
(1987) (viewing the exclusionary rule as a judicially created remedy rather than as
a constitutional right frees the court to engage in cost-benefit analysis to deter-
mine if evidence should be admitted in a particular case).
42. 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (Williams II).
43. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text; see also HALL, supra note
7, §§ 4:7-4:8, at 160 ("Calandra marks the demise of the judicial integrity ration-
ale and the rise of deterrence as the primary modern justification for the exclu-
sionary rule.").
1993]
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B. The Inevitable Discovery Exception
The Supreme Court adopted the inevitable discovery excep-
tion44 to the exclusionary rule in Nix v. Williams.4 5 In Nix, the
Court affirmed the murder conviction of a defendant who had mur-
dered a ten-year-old girl and deposited her body in a shallow
ditch.4  Evidence obtained from the girl's body was allowed to be
admitted on the basis of the inevitable discovery doctrine 4  as the
Court concluded that a massive search would have found the vic-
tim's body within a short period of time.48 The Court concluded
that the defendant's telling the officers of the location of the vic-
44. See generally Harold S. Novikoff, Note, The Inevitable Discovery Excep-
tion to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rules, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 88 (1974).
Judge Learned Hand is credited with first utilizing the inevitable discovery excep-
tion in Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1943). Police officers unlaw-
fully entered Somer's apartment where he was operating a still. Id. at 791. After
being informed by Somer's wife that he "would be back shortly," the officers
waited outside for his return. Id. When Somer arrived, he was arrested and sugar
and alcohol found in his car were seized. Id. Evidence seized from Somer's car and
his person was suppressed as the result of the illegality. Id. at 792. The court
remanded the case for further evidentiary hearings but stated that the illegally
obtained evidence could be admitted if the prosecution could show it would have
been found by lawful investigative procedures. Id.
45. 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (Williams I1).
46. Id. While the defendant was being transported by police, an officer elic-
ited incriminating statements from the defendant in violation of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. Id. at 437. The defendant was interrogated in the
police car despite an agreement between police and the defendant's attorney that
no questioning would occur during the trip. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 390-
91 (1977) (Williams I). Williams' original murder conviction was overturned by
the Supreme Court because of the Sixth Amendment violation. Id. at 387. The
inculpatory statements were elicited by a detective in what has become known as
the "Christian burial speech." The detective pleaded with the defendant for his
assistance in locating the victim's body so her parents could give her a decent
"Christian" burial to which she was entitled. See generally Yale Kamisar, Brewer
v. Williams--A Hard Look at a Discomforting Record, 66 GEo. L.J. 209 (1977);
Phillip E. Johnson, The Return of the "Christian Burial Speech" Case, 32 EMORY
L.J. 349 (1983). The body was found in an area two and one-half miles from
where a search was being conducted by approximately 200 volunteers. Nix, 467
U.S. at 448-49. The Court held that evidence as to the location and condition of
the victim's body was admissible because it inevitably would have been discovered
by the search. Id. at 449-50.
47. Nix, 467 U.S. at 444-47. The Supreme Court in Brewer v. Williams first
implied that evidence obtained from the victim's body might be admissible based
on the inevitable discovery doctrine. 430 U.S. 387, 406 n.12 (1977) (Williams 1).
See supra note 9.
48. Nix, 467 U.S. at 447.
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tim's body only hastened its eventual discovery."'
The Court held that illegally obtained evidence can be admit-
ted if the prosecution can prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the same evidence would have been eventually discov-
ered through lawful means.50 A requirement that police prove the
absence of bad faith was deemed unnecessary because it would put
police in a worse position than they would have been in had no
illegality occurred. 1 Related to the notion that the police be put in
no worse position is the reasoning that, since the evidence would
have been obtained by lawful means eventually, the prosecution
gains no benefit from the unlawful conduct, aside from hastening
the investigatory process.52 However, both these justifications for a
low standard of proof of inevitable discovery presuppose good faith
conduct on the part of investigating officers. 5 The Court's reason-
ing disregards the possibility that an officer may rationally decide
to pursue an unconstitutional course of action. 4 In spite of these
concerns, the Court determined that the societal costs of the exclu-
sionary rule outweighed any possible benefits to deterrence that a
good-faith requirement might produce. 55
In their dissent, Justices Brennan and Marshall took issue
with the adoption of a preponderance standard as the prosecu-
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 445-46. The principle that the prosecution be put in no worse posi-
tion has been viewed critically by commentators, wary of its vagueness, rationale
and possible implications. See Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 4, at 157-66;
Steven P. Grossman, The Doctrine of Inevitable Discovery: A Plea for Reasona-
ble Limitations, 92 DICK. L. REv. 313, 325-26 (1988).
52. Nix, 467 U.S. at 447.
53. The Court discounted the possibility of intentional police misconduct,
stating: "A police officer who is faced with the opportunity to obtain evidence
illegally will rarely, if ever, be in a position to calculate whether the evidence
sought would inevitably be discovered." Nix, 467 U.S. at 445.
54. See Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 4, at 167-175; Grossman, supra
note 51, at 332 n.101, 333-35 (officer could reasonably decide to pursue illegal
course of action by way of an illegal shortcut or in a situation in which it is un-
likely that evidence will ever be discovered except for illegal methods).
55. Nix, 467 U.S. at 446. The Court cited the case of Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for the proposition that there are already
significant disincentives to obtaining evidence illegally, such as departmental dis-
cipline and civil liability. Nix, 467 U.S. at 446. But see Grossman, supra note 51,
at 334 (neither departmental discipline nor civil liability has ever been shown to
be an effective deterrent to police misconduct).
3131993]
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tion's burden of proof as to the issue of inevitability of discovery."
The dissenters agreed that the inevitable discovery doctrine was
constitutional 7 but argued that the hypothetical nature of discov-
ery in an inevitable discovery inquiry mandates that the prosecu-
tion satisfy a heightened burden of proof."
The inevitable discovery exception is closely related to and
justified as a logical extension of the independent source exception,
which provides that illegally obtained evidence need not be ex-
cluded if the same evidence was secured by independent lawful
means.5 9 While it is true that the two doctrines are related and
serve a similar function, there is one key distinction that mandates
a higher burden of proof in the case of inevitable discovery.60 The
difference between the two exceptions is that in the case of the
independent source exception the evidence was actually found in
the course of a legal investigation.6 However, in circumstances in
which the inevitable discovery exception is applied, no legal inves-
tigation resulted in the discovery of the evidence.2 The dissenting
opinion articulated this key distinction between the inevitable dis-
covery doctrine and the independent source doctrine that necessi-
56. Nix, 467 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57. Justice Brennan had previously authored an opinion in which the Court
implied that the inevitable discovery doctrine is a constitutional exception to the
exclusionary rule. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470 (1980).
58. Nix, 467 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 441-44. Four years after Nix, the Supreme Court discussed the re-
lationship between the two doctrines in Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533
(1988). The Court, comparing the aborted search in Nix to the situation where a
legal search uncovered the same evidence previously obtained illegally, stated:
This "inevitable discovery" doctrine obviously assumes the validity of
the independent source doctrine as applied to evidence initially acquired
unlawfully. It would make no sense to admit the evidence because the
independent search, had it not been aborted, would have found the body,
but to exclude the evidence if the search had continued and had in fact
found the body. The inevitable discovery doctrine, with its distinct re-
quirements, is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source
doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact dis-
covered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it in-
evitably would have been discovered.
Id. at 539.
60. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Edward M. Macon,
Note, Nix v. Williams: The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule, 19 U. RICH. L. REv. 353, 359-62 (1985).
61. Nix, 467 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62. Id.
[Vol. 15:305314
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tates a higher burden of proof for the former. Justice Brennan rea-
soned that in cases involving the inevitable discovery doctrine, the
evidence "has not actually been obtained from an independent
source, but rather would have been discovered as a matter of
course if independent investigations were allowed to proceed."63 A
higher standard of proof of inevitability would ensure that the
"hypothetical finding is narrowly confined to circumstances that
are functionally equivalent to an independent source, and to pro-
tect fully the fundamental rights served by the exclusionary
rule. ' 64 The dissenters argued that a clear and convincing standard
of proof was necessary because of the speculative nature of the evi-
dence sought to be admitted and the hypothetical nature of the
inquiry.6 5 The heightened burden was advocated additionally as a
means of impressing upon the trial judge the importance of the
decision.6
THE CASE
On the evening of 27 October 1988, Daniel Garner, armed with
a .25 caliber Beretta pistol, entered a Fayetteville convenience
store located near his residence and demanded that the clerk give
him money.67 The clerk, who knew the defendant as a regular cus-
tomer, responded, "Danny, stop playing around. Put the gun
away."68 The defendant told the clerk, "Listen bitch, I'm not play-
ing."69 The defendant then shot her and took the money from the
cash register.70 The defendant subsequently told an -acquain-
tance 7 1 who testified for the State at trial, about the robbery of
the convenience store.72
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 459-60.
67. State v. Garner, 331 N.C. 491, 496, 417 S.E.2d 502, 504 (1992).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. The acquaintence, Brad Dickens, testified pursuant to a proposed plea-
bargain arising from a first-degree burglary charge. Id. The break-in was commit-
ted by the two the same night the defendant told Dickens about his prior robbery
of the convenience store. Id.
72. Id. Dickens, also testified that he had seen Garner in possession of the
automatic handgun which Dickens identified at trial. Garner told Dickens, "they
wouldn't suspect [Garner] because he lived right there and he came in all the time
and they knew him." Id.
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On 18 November 1988, law enforcement officers went to a resi-
dence at which the defendant was supposedly located and were
given permission to enter and search.7 3 Officers found the defend-
ant and arrested him.7 4 Officers then obtained a search warrant for
the defendant's residence.7 5 A magistrate issued the warrant upon
a finding of probable cause.76 However, the probable cause affidavit
presented to the magistrate contained a false statement.7 7 The evi-
dence seized from the defendant's residence included a box for a
Beretta handgun, a receipt from Jim's Pawnshop for the purchase
of a Beretta handgun, and five .25 caliber bullets.7 1 Law enforce-
ment officers proceeded to Jim's Pawnshop in Fayetteville and ob-
tained another copy of the Beretta handgun purchase receipt and
the defendant's Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (hereinafter
"ATF") application to purchase the pistol.7 9
Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress all evidence,
both primary and derivative, obtained as a result of the search of
his residence.80 The trial court allowed the motion to suppress the
73. Id. at 497, 417 S.E.2d, at 505.
74. Id. Among the evidence obtained at the residence were a bank bag similar
to the one missing from the convenience store, a box of .25 caliber ammunition,
and a .25 caliber Beretta handgun later established to be the weapon used in the
convenience store killing. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 498, 417 S.E.2d at 505. The State's firearms identification expert,
S.B.I. Lab Technician, R.N. Marrs, told Cumberland law enforcement officers
that the spent casings found at the convenience store and at the scenes of two
other crimes of which the defendant was suspected were all fired from the same
gun. Id. However, the handgun taken from the defendant's coat was not delivered
to the S.B.I. until 21 November 1988. Id. Thus, Agent Marrs had no firearm avail-
able for ballistics comparison on 18 November 1988 and was unable to truthfully
say that any specific pistol was the gun used in both crimes. Id.
78. Id. The serial number listed on the box and the receipt corresponded
with the serial number on the handgun taken from the defendant's coat at the
time of his arrest. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. The defendant contended suppression of the evidence was required on
the basis of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Consti-
tution and Article I, Sections 19, 20 and 23 of the North Carolina Constitution.
Id. The primary evidence, the gun box and the purchase receipt, were the items
obtained from the defendant's residence. Id. The derivative evidence, a duplicate
copy of the purchase receipt and the ATF records of the purchase, consisted of
the documents obtained by officers from Jim's Pawnshop. Id.
The defendant also filed a motion to suppress any evidence related to the
discovery of the handgun in the pocket of his jacket. The defendant contended
(Vol. 15:305
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primary evidence; that is, all items obtained directly from the de-
fendant's residence."1 The trial court ruled that this evidence must
be excluded because the search warrant did not state sufficient
facts to establish probable cause to search the residence.82 The
trial court did, however, except from the suppression orders, on the
basis of the inevitable discovery doctrine, the derivative evidence
from the pawnshop.83 The trial court allowed the derivative evi-
dence because the officers could have conducted a routine check
and discovered the duplicate receipt and ATF records.8 4 The trial
court concluded as a matter of law that the State had proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that the information at the pawn-
shop would have been discovered inevitably by lawful means.8 5
At trial, the State introduced evidence obtained from the per-
missive search of the residence where the defendant was arrested,
as well as the derivative evidence obtained from the pawnshop.88
The State's firearms identification expert positively identified the
spent casings and bullets recovered from the convenience store as
having been fired from the handgun recovered from the defend-
ant's coat at the time of his arrest.81 A jury found the defendant
guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon and of first-degree mur-
der on theories of both premeditation and deliberation and felony-
murder."
On appeal, the defendant argued against the adoption of the
inevitable discovery exception and in the alternative, the defend-
that the search of his jacket exceeded the scope of the permissive search of the
residence at which he was arrested. See Record at 8-13.
81. Garner, 331 N.C. at 499, 417 S.E.2d at 506.
82. Id.
83. Id. The trial court found that "but for" the fact the information was
readily ascertainable by the pawnshop receipt found at the defendant's residence
the officers would have conducted a routine check and discovered the duplicate
receipt and ATF records by lawful means. Id. The court concluded the State had
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the information at the pawnshop
would have been discovered inevitably by lawful means. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 495, 417 S.E.2d at 503. The defendant was sentenced to consecutive
terms of life imprisonment for the murder and twenty-five years imprisonment
for the armed robbery. Id. The defendant appealed his murder conviction to the
North Carolina Supreme Court as a matter of right. Id. The North Carolina Su-
preme Court allowed the defendant's motion to bypass the North Carolina Court
of Appeals with regard to his appeal of the armed robbery conviciton. Id.
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ant urged the following restrictions on its application: (1) a clear
and convincing standard of proof as to the inevitability of discov-
ery;89 (2) a requirement that there be an ongoing, independent in-
vestigation in progress at the time the illegal discovery occurs; 0
and (3) a requirement that the State prove the absence of bad
faith on the part of the investigating officers.9 1 The North Carolina
Supreme Court adopted the exception without any of the con-
straints advocated by the defendant.9 2 The court affirmed the de-
fendant's murder conviction and "put its imprimatur on the inevi-
table discovery doctrine" as a "logical and meaningful extension of
our law."93
ANALYSIS
A. The Burden of Proof
The North Carolina Supreme Court followed the lead of the
Nix Court and adopted a preponderance of the evidence standard
as the prosecution's burden of proof as to the inevitability of dis-
covery. 4 The majority engaged in very little independent analysis
regarding the parameters of the inevitable discovery doctrine; a
striking example of this abdication is the majority's approach to
the burden of proof issue. The court relied solely on the Nix opin-
ion for the justifications of the preponderance standard.9 5 How-
89. Id. at 503, 417 S.E.2d at 508.
90. Id. at 502, 417 S.E.2d at 508.
91. Id. at 507, 417 S.E.2d at 510.
92. Garner, 331 N.C. at 507, 417 S.E.2d at 511.
93. Id. at 500, 417 S.E.2d at 507.
94. Id. at 502, 417 S.E.2d at 508. The court quoted from Nix:
If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by
lawful means... then.the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the
evidence should be received.... Anything less would reject logic, experi-
ence, and common sense.
Id. (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)). But see Note, Leading
Cases of the 1983 Term, 98 HARv. L. REV. 87, 129-30 (1984) [hereinafter Leading
Cases] ("The Williams II Court... adopted an inappropriately lenient standard
of proof for triggering the exception .... A standard of proof demanding clear
and convincing -evidence is thus essential to preclude undue speculation and
overly generous deference to police testimony."); Vincent A. Nagler, Note, Nix v.
Williams: Conjecture Enters the Exclusionary Rule, 5 PACE L. REv. 657, 690
(1985) ("The choice of preponderance of the evidence as the burden of proof
could lead to hypothetical findings that are erroneous.").
95. Garner, 331 N.C. at 503-04, 417 S.E.2d at 508-09.
318 [Vol. 15:305
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ever, there are two factors that render this reliance faulty: (1) the
Supreme Court decided on the preponderance standard because it
is the traditional burden of proof employed at suppression hear-
ings, an analogy that has been much maligned,9 s and (2) North
Carolina, at least before Garner, had relied on the principle of ju-
dicial integrity as a justification for its exclusionary rule.9 7
In Garner, the State presented testimony of three law enforce-
ment officers that normal law enforcement procedure involved
checking the Police Identification Network (hereinafter "PIN")
records to determine whether a recovered weapon was stolen and
96. The Supreme Court in Nix justified the relatively low quantum of proof
on the issue of inevitability of discovery as follows:
As to the quantum of proof, we have already established some relevant
guidelines. In United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178 n.14, 39 L. Ed.
2d 242, 94 S. Ct. 988 (1974) . . ., we stated that "the controlling burden of
proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than
proof by a preponderance of the evidence." In Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S.
477, 488 (1972), we observed "from our experience [that] no substantial
evidence has accumulated that federal rights have suffered from deter-
mining admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence" and held that
the prosecution must prove by a. preponderance of the evidence that a
confession sought to be used at trial was voluntary. We are unwilling to
impose added burdens on the already difficult task of proving guilt in
criminal cases by enlarging the barrier to placing evidence of unques-
tioned truth before juries.
Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5. In another area in which a defendant's rights could be
violated by police wrongdoing the Supreme Court had required a heightened bur-
den of proof. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (prosecution must prove
by clear and convincing evidence that in-court identifications were the product of
a source independent of a line-up conducted in the absence of defense counsel).
The Court, in distinguishing the speculative nature of a witness' in-court identifi-
cation addressed in Wade, stated:
[ilnevitable discovery involves no speculative elements but focuses on
demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeach-
ment and does not require a departure from the usual burden of proof at
suppression hearings.
Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5. Commentators have been critical of the Court's analogy
to the standard of proof required at suppression hearings rather than that em-
ployed in the in-court identification situation. See Nagler, supra note 94, at 690
("It is apparent that the rationale used in Wade to justify a clear and convincing
standard could have been used to adopt the same burden of proof for the inevita-
ble discovery exception: both determinations require a similar amount of conjec-
ture."). Grossman, supra note 51, at 351-54 (advocating a clear and convincing
standard of proof for same reasons as were relied upon in Wade).
97. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988). See infra
notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
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the ATF records to find out the time and place of its sale if the
weapon had not been reported as stolen.98 The court was convinced
that an independent inquiry of the ATF records would have been
conducted as a matter of normal investigatory procedure and that
such a check would have resulted in the lead to the gun
merchant.9 9 Thus, the court concluded that the State had met its
burden of proving inevitable discovery of the information obtained
at the pawnshop, and that the trial court's application of the doc-
trine did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.100
The defendant conceded that the question of the use of the
inevitable discovery doctrine had been settled by Nix as regarded
the federal constitution. The defendant argued, however, that the
derivative evidence obtained from the pawnshop should have been
suppressed under the exclusionary rule arising from Article I, sec-
tion 20 of the North Carolina Constitution. 101 The court flatly re-
98. Garner, 331 N.C. at 504, 417 S.E.2d at 509.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. See also Defendant's Brief at 27-32. Article I, section 20 is captioned
"General Warrants" and provides:
General warrants, whereby an officer or other person may be commanded
to search suspected places without evidence of the act committed, or to
seize any person or persons not named, whose offense is not particularly
described and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty and shall
not be granted.
N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 20. The exclusion of evidence obtained by unconstitutional
means was provided for by statute in North Carolina in 1937 by enactment of
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27. The current applicable statutory law is titled "Exclusion
or suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence" and provides:
Upon timely motion, evidence must be suppressed if:
(1) Its exclusion is required by the Constitution of the United States or
the Constitution of the State of North Carolina; or
(2) It is obtained as a result of a substantial violation of the provisions of
this Chapter. In determining whether a violation is substantial, the court
must consider all the circumstances, including:
a. The importance of the particular interest violated;
b. The extent of the deviation from lawful conduct;
c. The extent to which the violation was willful;
d. The extent to which exclusion will tend to deter future violations of
this Chapter.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-974 (1988). The North Carolina Supreme Court has had
occasion to require the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence and has
stated that the state constitution, "like the Federal Constitution, requires the ex-
clusion of evidence obtained by unreasonable search and seizure." State v. Carter,
322 N.C. 709, 712, 370 S.E.2d 553, 555 (1988); State v. Reams, 277 N.C. 391, 175
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jected the defendant's assertion that the North Carolina Constitu-
tion provides broader protection of individual rights than those
based on the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. '
The court adopted a preponderance of the evidence standard as
the quantum of proof by which the prosecution must demonstrate
inevitability.20 As support for this standard of proof, the court
quoted from a footnote in the Nix opinion 0 4 that justified the pre-
ponderance standard because it constituted the quantum of proof
customarily applied in suppression hearings.'0 5
The concurring opinion disagreed with the majority's aban-
donment of the judicial integrity justification and the closely re-
lated issue of the standard of proof of inevitability.106 The United
States Supreme Court in Nix concluded that a preponderance of
the evidence standard sufficiently served the deterrence rationale
of the exclusionary rule.10 7 However, the concurring opinion ex-
plained that the exclusionary rule in North Carolina is designed to
further two essential objectives: (1) the preservation of judicial in-
tegrity and (2) the deterrence of police misconduct. 08 The major-
S.E.2d 65 (1970); State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 163 S.E.2d 376 (1968).
102. Garner, 331 N.C. at 506-07, 417 S.E.2d at 510-11. The court, after not-
ing that the general warrants provision of the state constitution should not be
"viewed as a vehicle for any inventive expansion of our law" held the defendant's
contention that Article I, Section 20 "should be read as an extension of rights
beyond those afforded in the Fourth Amendment is misplaced." Id.
103. Id. at 504, 417 S.E.2d at 509.
104. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
105. Garner, 331 N.C. at 503, 417 S.E.2d at 508.
106. Id. at 510, 417 S.E.2d at 512 (Frye, J., concurring).
107. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 n.4 (1984). The Supreme Court
reached this conclusion by analogizing the purpose of the inevitable discovery ex-
ception to that of the harmless error rule:
The ultimate or inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule is
closely related in purpose to the harmless-error rule of Chapman v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824, 24 ALR 3d 1065
(1967). The harmless-constitutional-error rule "serve[s] a very useful
purpose insofar as [it] block[s] setting aside convictions for small errors
or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result
of the trial." The purpose of the inevitable discovery rule is to block set-
ting aside convictions that would have been obtained without police
misconduct.
Id.
108. Garner, 331 N.C. at 510, 417 S.E.2d at 512 (Frye, J., concurring). Also,
in declining to adopt a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in Carter, the
North Carolina Supreme Court stated:
North Carolina, however, justifies its exclusionary rule not only on deter-
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ity dismissed the defendant's argument that admission of illegally
seized evidence serves to undermine the integrity of the judicial
branch with a single quote from Nix regarding the public policy
benefits of the inevitable discovery doctrine.10 9 With very little in
the way of analysis, the majority disregarded the preservation of
judicial integrity as an objective of North Carolina's exclusionary
rule.
The United States Supreme Court, in the years before Nix,
had primarily grounded its exclusionary rule decisions on the de-
terrence rationale and had all but abandoned the judicial integrity
principle.110 Thus, it came as no surprise that the Nix Court only
addressed the judicial integrity argument in a cursory manner and
as a secondary basis.' The North Carolina Supreme Court, how-
ever, had extolled the importance of the exclusionary rule and its
justifications only four years prior to the Garner decision.1 In
State v. Carter, the court exercised its prerogative to interpret the
state constitution differently than the United States Supreme
Court had construed the Federal Constitution.11 In Carter, the
court declined to follow the Supreme Court's adoption of a good
rence but upon the preservation of the integrity of the judicial branch of
government and its tradition based upon fifty years' experience in follow-
ing the expressed public policy of the state. Under the judicial integrity
theory, our constitution demands the exclusion of illegally seized evi-
dence. The courts cannot condone or participate in the protection of
those who violate the constitutional rights of others.
State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 723, 370 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1988).
109. Garner, 331 N.C. at 508, 417 S.E.2d at 511. Justice Lake wrote:
Exclusion of physical evidence that would inevitably have been discov-
ered adds nothing to either the integrity or fairness of a criminal trial...
. Suppression, in these circumstances, would do nothing whatever to pro-
mote the integrity of the trial process, but would inflict a wholly unac-
ceptable burden on the administration of criminal justice.
Id. (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 446-47).
110. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
111. Commentators have criticized the Nix Court for its failure to reconcile
application of the inevitable discovery doctrine with the judicial integrity princi-
ple. See, e.g., Leading Cases, supra note 94, at 124-27.
112. State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988).
113. Id. Justice Martin wrote:
[W]e have the authority to construe our own constitution differently
from the construction by the United States Supreme Court of the Fed-
eral Constitution, as long as our citizens are thereby accorded no lesser
rights than they are guaranteed by the parallel federal provision.
Id. at 713, 370 S.E.2d at 555.
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faith exception to the exclusionary rule."1 4 The decision to exclude
the evidence unconstitutionally seized was based on both the de-
terrence and judicial integrity rationales. 115 While the majority
opinion in Garner disregarded the dual basis for the Carter deci-
sion, Justice Frye, in his concurring opinion, addressed this aban-
donment of the judicial integrity justification. 16
Given that North Carolina had previously based its exclusion-
ary rule on the principle of judicial integrity as well as the deter-
rence rationale, the court should have enacted a higher standard of
proof of inevitability. The North Carolina Supreme Court, prior to
the Garner decision, had given great deference to the judicial in-
tegrity basis for the exclusionary rule, rather than the lip-servce
paid it by the United States Supreme Court." This distinction, in
view of the purpose and justifications of the exclusionary rule,
compels an independent discussion and analysis of the inevitable
discovery doctrine and its parameters. The need for a separate
treatment is especially mandated with regard to the quantum of
proof issue, since the standard now adopted undermines the prin-
114. Id. at 724, 370 S.E.2d at 561.
115. Id. at 722-23, 370 S.E.2d at 560-61.
116. State v. Garner, 331 N.C. 491, 511-12, 417 S.E.2d at 513-14 (Frye, J.,
concurring). Justice Frye quoted from Carter, concerning the societal importance
of the exclusionary rule:
The exclusionary sanction is indispensable to give effect to the constitu-
tional principles prohibiting unreasonable search and seizure. We are
persuaded that the exclusionary rule is the only effective bulwark against
governmental disregard for constitutionally protected privacy rights.
Equally of importance in our reasoning, we adhere to the rule for the
sake of maintaining the integrity of the judicial branch of government.
The preservation of the right to be protected from unreasonable
search and seizure guaranteed by our state constitution demands that
the courts of this state not condone violations thereof by admitting the
fruits of illegal searches into evidence ....
In determining the value of the exclusionary rule, we regard the cru-
cial matter of the integrity of the judiciary and the maintenance of an
effective institutional deterrence to police violation of the constitutional
law of search and seizure to be the paramount considerations. We do not
discount the implications of the failure to convict the guilty because pro-
bative evidence has been excluded in even one grave criminal case. The
resulting injuries to victim, family, and society are tolerable not because
they are slight but because the constitutional values thereby safeguarded
are so precious.
Id. (quoting Carter, 322 N.C. at 719-22, 370 S.E.2d at 559-61).
117. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988); see supra
notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
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ciple of judicial integrity. The Nix decision, even though based al-
most solely upon the deterrence rationale, has been repeatedly
criticized for the inadequate burden of proof placed upon the pros-
ecution.1 In addition to the commentators that have disapproved
the preponderance standard, some courts prior to the Nix decision
had enacted a more demanding standard of proof.""'
The concurring opinion, echoing Justice Brennan's sentiments
in Nix, specifically advocated a requirement that the prosecution
prove inevitability of discovery by clear and convincing evidence.
12 0
Justice Frye wrote that only a higher burden of proof would "en-
sure that the exclusionary rule will continue to serve its historic
function of protecting the people of North Carolina from unreason-
able searches and seizures. 1 21 Justice Frye also noted the inconsis-
tency of a preponderance standard with the question of inevitabil-
ity of discovery.1 22 Although he disagreed with the parameters of
the exception as adopted, Justice Frye deemed the introduction of
the derivative evidence harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and,
therefore, concurred in the court's result. 23
118. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
119. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits required that the inevitability of dis-
covery be shown to a reasonable probability. United States v. Brookins' 614 F.2d
1037, 1048 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Roper, 681 F.2d 1354, 1358 (11th Cir.
1982). The Tenth Circuit's application of the exception required that there be "no
doubt" as to the inevitability of lawful discovery. United States v. Romero, 692
F.2d 699, 704 (10th Cir. 1982). The Fifth Circuit originally rejected the inevitable
discovery exception. Parker v. Estelle, 498 F.2d 625, 629-30 n.12 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975) ("This rule might minimize the number of times
a guilty defendant could avoid conviction but is hard to square with the deterrent
purposes of the various exclusionary rules."); United States v. Castellana, 488
F.2d. 65, 68 (5th Cir. 1973). At least one state court, following Nix, rejected the
preponderance standard in favor of the clear and convincing standard. See State
v. Sugar, 495 A.2d 90 (N.J. 1985).
120. Garner, 331 N.C. at 510, 417 S.E.2d at 512 (Frye, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 514, 417 S.E.2d at 515.
122. Id. at 510, 417 S.E.2d at 512. In a footnote, Justice Frye added:
Inevitable means "unable to be avoided, evaded, or escaped; certain; nec-
essary." Random House Webster's College Dictionary 688 (1991). It thus
seems inconsistent to ask whether it is "more likely than not" that evi-
dence would have beei "inevitably" discovered.
Id. at 513 n.2, 417 S.E.2d at 515 n.2. Several commentators, echoing Justice Frye's
sentiments, have questioned the seeming contradiction of terms. See Grossman
supra note 51, at 333 n.104 (preponderance standard "makes use of the word 'in-
evitable' superflous if not misleading"); Macon, supra note 60, at 363 n.81.
123. Garner, 331 N.C. at 514, 417 S.E.2d at 514. Justice Frye noted that, on
the facts of the case, the State may have been able to prove inevitability of dis-
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B. No Requirement of an Independent, Ongoing Investigation
One of the proposed constraints, and the weakest of the three
urged by the defendant, would require the prosecution to show
that an independent, ongoing investigation was under way at the
time the evidence was discovered illegally.12 4 The flexible standard
the court adopted in Garner as to the necessity of an independent,
ongoing investigation is adequate to ensure inevitability if other
constraints such as a higher burden of proof and a good faith re-
quirement are imposed. This requirement would cause the inevita-
ble discovery doctrine to more closely resemble the independent
source doctrine because the police are required to show they were
pursuing steps that, if allowed to continue, would have resulted in
an actual independent source for the evidence.1"5 It removes from
the realm of the hypothetical the line of investigation that would
have led to the tainted evidence. 12 Otherwise, it is argued, the po-
lice have the benefit of hindsight with which to show what investi-
gatory steps would have been taken.1 7 Requiring an alternative
line of investigation would act to counterbalance the great defer-
ence given to police testimony in criminal prosections. 128
Despite arguments to the contrary, the court was persuaded
by the reasoning of the First Circuit in United States v. Silves-
covery by clear and convincing evidence but felt it unecessary to reach that ques-
tion because the admission of the derivative evidence was not prejudicial to the
defendant. Id. Justice Frye concluded the evidence showing the defendant had
purchased the murder weapon was not crucial to the State's case. Justice Frye
though the State had met its burden of proving harmlessness beyond a reasonable
doubt because of the following facts: (1) the State's firearm identification expert
positively identified the handgun legally seized from the defendant's coat at the
time of his arrest as the murder weapon; (2) the handgun established to be the
murder weapon was seen in the defendant's possession prior to the murder; and
(3) the defendant confessed the murder to Brad Dickens. Id. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-1443(b) (1988) (harmless error statute).
124. Garner, 331 N.C. at 502, 417 S.E.2d at 508.
125. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 459 (1984)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. See Schrock & Welsch, supra note 30, at 1052-53 (lawful alternative
method of discovery severs causal connection between the illegality and the other-
wise tainted evidence).
127. See Mark P. Schnapp, Comment, Inevitable Discovery: The Hypotheti-
cal Independent Source Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV.
137, 155 (1976) (" 'sophisticated argument' aided by hindsight can be used to
show what the police would have done in a given situation"); see also State v.
Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 259 (Iowa 1979) (proof of discovery may be
fabricated).
128. See Schnapp, supra note 127, at 155.
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tri 2 9 and adopted an identical approach.30 The court declined to
impose a requirement that there be evidence of an ongoing, inde-
pendent investigation present in every case. 3 ' Rather, the court
will have the discretion to determine if that is a necessary element
for the State to demonstrate inevitability on a case-by-case ba-
sis.13 2 The courts are split as to the requirement that the police
possessed and were actively pursuing the leads that would have re-
sulted in discovery.133
The defendant argued for exclusion of the evidence, as no in-
dependent investigation into the ownership records for the murder
weapon was under way.'"" The defendant pointed out that the se-
rial number of the handgun was not "run through" the PIN or
ATF systems after the pawnshop receipt was found at the defend-
ant's residence.' The defendant also contended that the trial
court's application of the inevitable discovery doctrine was errone-
ous because no evidence was presented concerning the reliability of
those investigatory procedures. 3 6
The court justifiably rejected the requirement of an indepen-
dent, ongoing investigation. The defendant's argument in itself
demonstrates the unwieldy constraints and useless effort that
would result from such a requirement. In this case, the police had
a purchase receipt for the gun in their hands and their next step,
naturally, was to proceed to the pawnshop for confirmation of the
sale of the handgun to the defendant. It is unreasonable to expect
the police to pursue normal procedure to "find" information that
they have already obtained from another source. This should not
be seen as a sanction of an illegal shortcut but a realization of what
129. 787 F.2d 736 (1st Cir. 1986) (ongoing investigation requirement rejected
as too inflexible), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988).
130. State v. Garner, 331 N.C. 491, 502-03, 417 S.E.2d 502, 508 (1992).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the inevitable dis-
covery doctrine without discussing the requirement of an ongoing investigation.
See United States v. Merriweather, 777 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1098 (1986). The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits have required an ongoing investigation at the time of the police misconduct.
See United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Owens, 782 F.2d 146 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Satterfleld, 743 F.2d 827
(11th Cir. 1984).
134. See Defendant's Brief at 23-27.
135. See id. at 26.
136. Id.
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law enforcement officers will next do in such a situation. The ille-
gal action would have already occurred and a requirement that
normal investigatory procedures be followed, nonetheless, would
merely be a meaningless formality. The question of the reliability
or accuracy of the investigatory steps can be adressed when the
trial judge makes a determination of the likelihood of eventual dis-
covery. The concern about overly generous reliance on police testi-
mony can also be effectively dealt with by enacting a higher bur-
den of proof.13 7 Requiring a higher burden of proof and good faith
conduct on the part of the police would render unnecessary any
requirement of an ongoing, independent investigation.
C. No Requirement that Prosecution Prove Absence of Bad
Faith
The most troubling aspect of the Garner decision, aside from
the burden of proof issue, is the court's refusal to impose a require-
ment that the prosecution prove the absence of bad faith on the
part of the investigating officers. The court again failed to distin-
guish prior exclusionary rule cases or offer any convincing justifica-
tions for such a sweeping exception to the rule of exclusion.
The defendant argued that, in the event the court adopted the
inevitable discovery doctrine, a requirement should be imposed
that the State prove the absence of bad faith on the part of the
investigating officers.3 8 The defendant relied mainly on the court's
decision in State v. Carter as support for the absence of bad faith
requirement.13 9 In Carter, the court held there is no good faith ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule under the North Carolina Consti-
tution. 40 The defendant contended the element of absence of bad
faith is necessary to maintain "minimal safeguards against inten-
tional police misconduct.' 4' The court failed to discuss the con-
tention or the apparent contradiction with the court's holding in
Carter and dismissed the argument as having no merit.142 The
137. See Liana R. McCants, Comment, Should "Good Faith" Be An Element
of the Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 17 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 1123, 1136 (1984) (good faith requirement advocated as a way to combat
reasoning of police that they can later persuade a judge of eventual discovery by
lawful means).
138. State v. Garner, 331 N.C. 491, 507, 417 S.E.2d 502, 510 (1992).
139. Id.
140. State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988).
141. Garner, 331 N.C. at 507, 417 S.E.2d at 511.
142. Id.
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court affirmed the trial court's ruling that "the question of bad
faith was irrelevant in the proper application of the inevitable dis-
covery doctrine."'14 s Despite the court's summary dismissal of the
question, it is significant that the court had previously rejected a
good faith exception to the state constitution's exclusionary rule. 44
In Carter, the court agreed with critics who were concerned that a
good faith exception would consume the exclusionary rule.146
The court, again, offered little analysis or justification for its
refusal to adopt a requirement that the prosecution prove the ab-
sence of bad faith, but rather based its reasoning on a quote from
Nix. 46 As with the burden of proof issue, the court blindly fol-
lowed the Nix Court's "no worse off" principle as a justification for
providing a broad application to the inevitable discovery
doctrine. 147
However, the court's reliance on Nix regarding the officer's
good faith is unjustified for two reasons: (1) North Carolina had
previously declined to adopt a good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule; and (2) the good faith requirement is necessary to de-
ter intentional violations of constitutional rights. It is inconsistent
that the court would reject the good faith exception itself, for fear
that such an exception would undermine the purpose of the exclu-
143. Id.
144. See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
145. State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 715-16, 370 S.E.2d 553, 557 (1988). The
court quoted from a New Jersey opinion which articulated the same concern.
According to Justice White's formulation, in suppression cases involving
warrants the application of the exclusionary rule will be the exception,
and recognition of the good-faith "exception" will be the prevailing
standard.
Id. (quoting State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 846 (N.J. 1987) (declining to
follow the Leon good faith exception to exclusionary rule)).
146. Garner, 331 N.C. at 508, 417 S.E.2d at 511.
The requirement that the prosecution must prove the absence of bad
faith, imposed here by the Court of Appeals, would place courts in the
position of withholding from juries relevant and undoubted truth that
would have been available to police absent any unlawful police activity.
Of course, that view would put the police in a worse position than they
would have been in if no unlawful conduct had transpired. And, of equal
importance, it wholly fails to take into account the enormous societal
cost of excluding truth in the search for truth in the administration of
justice. Nothing in this Court's prior holdings supports any such formal-
istic, pointless, and punitive approach.
Id. (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445 (1984)).
147. Garner, 331 N.C. at 508, 417 S.E.2d at 511.
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sionary rule, and yet, not require the proof of absence of bad faith
when that concern is even more compelling. The failure of the Nix
Court to impose a good faith requirement on the part of the inves-
tigating officers has been repeatedly criticized.1 48 Many commenta-
tors feel the rationale of the exclusionary rule is undermined by
the failure to distinguish intentional or bad faith violations of con-
stitutional rights.149 This same reasoning has been employed by
numerous courts that have required good faith as an element of
the inevitable discovery doctrine. 150 The lack of a good faith re-
quirement fails to distinguish the intentional violations that most
need to be deterred, from the inadvertent violations that more
148. See, e.g., Roert K. Hendrix, Note, The Inevitable Discovery Exception
to the Exclusionary Rule: Nix v. Williams, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 1087, 1096 (1986)
(lack of good faith requirement is "open invitation to illegal action").
149. See LAFAvE, supra note 1, § 11.4(a), at 382; The Iowa Supreme Court,
in affirming Robert Williams' second murder conviction (which later made its way
to the Supreme Court as Williams II), adopted a two-part test for application of
the inevitable discovery exception. This approach had been advocated by Profes-
sor LaFave as a means of conforming the exception to constitutional mandates.
The court articulated the requirements of the test as follows:
After the defendant has shown unlawful conduct on the part of the polce,
the State has the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that (1) the police did not act in bad faith for the purpose of hastening
discovery of the evidence in question, and (2) that the evidence in ques-
tion would have been discovered by lawful means.
State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 260 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 921
(1980). The Supreme Court rejected the two-part test, concluding that an inquiry
as to the officer's state of mind was unnecessary. Nix, 467 U.S. at 445-46. On
review of the defendant's petition for habeas corpus relief, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals addressed th6 issue of the bad faith element as follows:
At the oral argument the question whether the bad-faith element of the
test might be dispensed with was raised from the bench, but counsel for
the State expressly disclaimed any such position. We agree with counsel
and with the Supreme Court of Iowa that if there is to be an inevitable-
discovery exception the State should not receive its benefit without prov-
ing that the police did not act in bad faith. Otherwise the temptation to
risk deliberate violations of the Sixth Amendment would be too great,
and the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule reduced too far.
Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164, 1169 n.5 (1983), rev'd, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). See
also Macon, supra note 60, at 365; Schnapp, supra note 127, at 156-66 (exception
should not operate where officers have acted in bad faith to accelerate discovery
by use of illegal shortcuts); Jeffrey M. Bain & Michael K. Kelly, Comment, Fruit
of the Poisonous Tree: Recent Developments as Viewed Through Its Exceptions,
31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 615, 627 (1977) ("exception ... based on conjecture").
150. See, e.g., State v. Holler 459 A.2d 1143, 1147 (N.H. 1983) ("element of
good faith on the part of police is inherent in the inevitable discovery exception").
1993]
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often deserve to be excused. This undermines the exclusionary rule
even when it is primarily grounded on the deterrence principle be-
cause it is intentional misconduct that can be most effectively de-
terred.151 The need for a good faith requirement is even more com-
pelling when the preservation of judicial integrity is among the
objectives of the exclusionary rule, as has been the case in North
Carolina.
CONCLUSION
The inevitable discovery doctrine can be utilized in a way that
does not undermine the purpose of the exclusionary rule. However,
to ensure that the constitutional rights protected by the exclusion-
ary rule are not offended, the doctrine should be applied narrowly
and with great care. The inevitable discovery doctrine, as applied
by the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Garner, has not
been clearly defined nor limited in scope. Consequently, the indi-
vidual rights sought to be protected by the exclusionary rule may
be sacrificed, in exchange for only minimal benefits with regard to
the efficiency and effectiveness of criminal prosecutions.
The court blindly followed the Nix Court and imposed an
unacceptably lenient burden of proof. The preponderance standard
is not sufficient to serve the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary
rule and ultimately sanctions intentional police misconduct. The
preponderance standard will also have an adverse impact on the
principle of judicial integrity because of the likelihood of false
findings, in part due to the great deference given to police testi-
mony. A requirement that the prosecution demonstrate an absence
of bad faith on the part of the investigating officers is necessary to
deter intentional misconduct. The lack of such a requirement dis-
serves the objective of the preservation of judicial integrity and ac-
tually renders the court a party to the unconstitutional conduct.
Application of the inevitable discovery doctrine can comport with
the objectives of the exclusionary rule only if the prosecution dem-
151. The deterrent purpose of the exlusionary rule is frustrated by the ab-
sence of a good faith requirement because the inevitable discovery exception re-
sults in the excusal of unconstitutional "end runs and short cuts." Crews v.
United States, 389 A.2d 277, 293 (D.C. 1978), rev'd, 455 U.S. 463 (1980).
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onstrhtes: (1) the inevitability of discovery by clear and convincing
evidence, and (2) the absence of bad faith on the part of police in
hastening discovery of the evidence in question.
G. Chris Olson
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